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I. INTRODUCTION
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”), 1 an amendment to the
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) of 1938, added to § 6 of the FLSA
“the principle of equal pay for equal work regardless of sex.” 2 The
EPA was the first modern employment discrimination statute, and it
addresses a very specific form of gender discrimination in
employment—unequal pay for equal work. 3 Less than one year later,
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which also
prohibits sex-based wage discrimination. 4 Title VII is broader than
the EPA because it also prohibits many other forms of discriminatory
employment practices based on other protected traits including an
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 5 Although
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; Litigation and Alternative Dispute Resolution Certificate.
1
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000).
2
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 190 (1974).
3
MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 366 (3d ed. 2004).
4
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
5
Section 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). Section 703(a)(1) states
that it is an “unlawful employment practice” for a covered employer “to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation terms, conditions or privileges of
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both statutes protect an employee from sex-based wage discrimination
in employment, the statutes function differently. 6
Section 206(d)(1) of the EPA establishes that
[n]o employer having employees subject to any provisions of
this section shall discriminate, between employees on the basis
of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at
the rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees
of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on
jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions. 7
The EPA has four exceptions for discriminatory pay between the sexes
where an employer has in place “(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other
than sex.” 8 Thus, the EPA is divided into two parts—part one is
prohibitory, while the second part lays out the affirmative defenses. 9
The affirmative defenses, in effect, “authorize” employers to
differentiate in pay if the reason for that differentiation falls within one
of the four categories, even though that differentiation might otherwise
violate the Act. 10
The circuit courts are split in their interpretation of the “factor
other than sex” defense. 11 Employers frequently assert that a
difference in wages between employees of opposite sexes is the result
of basing their initial salary on the prior salary an employee was
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”
6
See County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981).
7
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000).
8
Id.
9
Gunther, 452 U.S. at 169.
10
Id.
11
See infra notes 13-14.
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earning elsewhere. They argue that the use of prior salary in setting
wages qualifies as a “factor other than sex,” and therefore is not a
violation of the EPA. 12 The Seventh Circuit, along with the Eighth
Circuit, finds that any gender-neutral reason asserted by the employer
qualifies as a factor other than sex. 13 On the other hand, several
circuits, including the Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, use a
legitimate business reason test when examining an employer’s “factor
other than sex.” 14
This article will show that the Seventh Circuit incorrectly
analyzed an EPA claim in Wernsing v. Department of Human
Services. 15 In this decision, the court also rejected the legitimate
business reason test from the Ninth Circuit based on the Seventh
Circuit’s incorrect analysis of an EPA claim. 16
Part of the problem interpreting the factor other than sex
defense stems from the interaction of the EPA with Title VII. The
Seventh Circuit treated the EPA claim in Wernsing as if it were the
same as a Title VII claim. 17 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit has made
EPA litigation defendant-friendly, creating an enormous difficulty for
a plaintiff seeking to prove a violation of the EPA, and has thus eroded
the intent and purpose of the statute.
II. THE FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX DEFENSE OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT
AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EQUAL PAY ACT AND TITLE VII
The Supreme Court has only decided one case brought under an
Equal Pay Act claim. 18 Although the Supreme Court’s decision
12

See infra notes 13-14.
Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005); Strecker
v. Grand Forks County Soc. Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1980).
14
Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992); Kouba v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982); Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841
F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988).
15
Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 466.
16
Id.
17
See infra note 125.
18
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
13
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provides some guidance for interpreting the Act’s factor other than sex
defense, the Supreme Court did not articulate a standard for
determining what qualifies as a factor other than sex. 19 In addition,
the Court has also examined the Act in claims brought under Title
VII. 20 An examination of the differences between EPA and Title VII
litigation, combined with the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the
EPA, and the Act’s purposes and legislative history, is an integral
inquiry in order to formulate a standard for determining what qualifies
as a factor other than sex.
A. Supreme Court decisions addressing the EPA’s Factor Other than
Sex Defense.
The landmark case of Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, has
been the only instance where the Supreme Court has decided a case
that was brought under the EPA. 21 Corning Glass involved a wage
disparity between male night shift inspectors and female day
inspectors. 22 The wage disparity had somewhat of a historical basis –
Corning initially instituted a night shift between 1925 and 1930 when
New York and Pennsylvania law prohibited women from working at
night. 23 Therefore, the company needed to fill the night shift inspector
position, traditionally a female position, with male day workers. 24
These men demanded and received higher wages than those paid to the
female day inspectors. 25 At this time, the only pay disparity between

19

Id.
County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); City of L.A. Dep’t of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). Both of these cases were brought
under Title VII’s Bennett Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000).
21
417 U.S. 188 (1974).
22
Id. at 190.
23
Id. at 191.
24
Id.
25
Id.
20
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the night shift and day shift positions existed with respect to the
position of inspector. 26
After the laws of New York and Pennsylvania were amended
to allow women to work at night, women at Corning were allowed to
bid on the higher paid night inspection jobs. 27 In 1969, a new
collective bargaining agreement eliminated the wage disparity
between day and night inspectors hired after the date of the agreement,
but provided a “red circle” rate for current inspectors, thus allowing
for a continued disparity between day and night inspectors. 28
Corning argued that day shift work and night shift work were
not performed under “similar working conditions” as required by the
EPA. 29 The Secretary of Labor contended that such a shift differential
would fall under the “factor other than sex” exception, and that
Corning had failed to prove that paying higher wages to its male night
inspectors was based on any factor other than sex. 30 The Court looked
to the statute’s language, history, and Congressional intent, and
determined that the work at issue was “equal work” as defined by the
EPA. 31
The Court found that Corning failed to prove that its
compensation system for the inspector position was not based upon
sex. 32 Although the EPA allows for wage differentials based on
nondiscriminatory shift differentials, in Corning the pay disparity
arose simply because the men originally thought the inspector work
performed by women demeaning. In order to perform this work
during a night shift, they demanded higher pay, but all other positions
were paid the same whether performed during the night or day shift. 33
Therefore, the Court concluded, the pay disparity “reflected a job
26

Id. at 191-92.
Id. at 192-93.
28
Id. at 194.
29
Id. at 197.
30
Id. at 197-202.
31
Id. at 203.
32
Id. at 204-05.
33
Id. at 205.
27
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market in which Corning could pay women less than men for the same
work.” 34
B. Supreme Court decision regarding the relationship between the
Equal Protection Act and Title VII.
The Supreme Court has also had occasion to examine the EPA
in cases brought under Title VII. County of Washington v. Gunther
involved the relationship between Title VII and the EPA. 35 The
Bennett Amendment, contained in section 703(h) of Title VII,
provides that
[i]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice under [Title
VII] for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in
determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or
to be paid to employees of such employer if such
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of [the Equal
Pay Act]. 36
The Supreme Court examined the affect of the Bennett Amendment on
Title VII wage-based discrimination claims in County of Washington
v. Gunther. 37
In County of Washington, female guards in a county jail filed a
wage discrimination claim under Title VII, alleging that the County of
Washington intentionally discriminated against them by paying the
female guards in the female section of the jail less than the wages paid
to the male guards in the male section of the jail. 38 The county
defended the suit by claiming that the Bennett Amendment restricted
sex-based wage discrimination claims under Title VII to those that

34

Id.
452 U.S. 161 (1981).
36
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2005).
37
County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
38
Id. at 163-64.
35
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could also be brought under the Equal Pay Act. 39 Because the Equal
Pay Act only permits claims for “equal work,” the county argued that
the Bennett Amendment precluded suit because the jobs of the male
and female guards were not “equal.” 40
The plaintiffs argued that the Bennett Amendment was
designed only to incorporate the four affirmative defenses of the EPA
into Title VII for sex-based wage discrimination claims, and therefore
did not restrict Title VII claims to the “equal or substantially equal
work” standard of the EPA. 41 The Supreme Court agreed with the
plaintiff’s argument, finding that the Bennett Amendment to Title VII
incorporated the affirmative defenses of the EPA into an unequal pay
claim under Title VII. 42 Additionally, the Court noted that it was not
deciding how discrimination litigation under Title VII should be
structured to incorporate the EPA’s affirmative defense of “factor
other than sex,” which requires an employer to prove that a wage
differential is not based on sex, different from Title VII’s burden of
proof shifting. 43
Although the Court did not articulate a standard for
determining what qualifies as a factor other than sex in Gunther, the
case does provide some guidance for determining how sex-based wage
discrimination claims should be decided. First, the Court noted that
employers may defend against charges of sex-based wage
discrimination under the EPA where pay differentials “are based on a
bona fide use of ‘other factors other than sex.’” 44 Also, the Court
recognized that EPA and Title VII are structured differently, and
function under different burdens of proof. 45
C. The Equal Pay Act and Title VII: Different Burdens of Proof.
39

Id. at 168.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 169-70.
44
Id. at 170. (emphasis added).
45
Id.
40
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One year after the EPA was enacted, Congress passed Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), prohibiting, inter alia,
gender discrimination in all “terms, conditions or privileges” of
employment. 46 Title VII also prohibits sex-based wage
discrimination, but unlike the EPA’s narrow application to wage
differentials attributable to sex discrimination, Title VII’s prohibitions
were “intended to be broadly inclusive, proscribing ‘not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation.’” 47 The structure of Title VII litigation,
with its shifting burdens of proof, varying defenses, and presumptions,
was designed to reflect its broad nature. 48 On the other hand, EPA
litigation, specifically the fourth affirmative defense, has been
structured differently than Title VII. 49 EPA litigation is designed to
allow employers to defend against charges of wage discrimination
where pay differentials are based “on a bona fide use of ‘other factors
other than sex.’” 50
1. EPA: Burden of Proof.
In order to make out a prima facie case under the EPA, the
plaintiff has a heavy burden of proof 51 to establish that employees of
the opposite sex receive different wages “for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility,
and which are performed under similar working conditions.” 52 A
female plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing “(1) higher
wages were paid to a male employee, (2) for equal work requiring
46

Section 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2005).
County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981) (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 439 (1971)).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
52
Id.
47
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substantially similar skill, effort and responsibilities, and (3) the work
was performed under similar working conditions.” 53 Once a prima
facie case is established, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
establish that the difference in pay is permitted under one of the four
exceptions, or affirmative defenses, permitted by the EPA. 54
Therefore, under the EPA, the “risk of nonpersuasion rests with the
employer on the ultimate issue of liability.” 55
The EPA does not require a plaintiff to show intent to
discriminate, and has been referred to as a “strict liability” statute for
this reason. 56 In contrast, under Title VII claims the burden of
persuasion rests with the plaintiff at all times to show discriminatory
intent. 57
2. Title VII: Burden of Proof.
The standard for proof of discrimination under Title VII is
different from the EPA because EPA litigation follows a two-step
burden-shifting paradigm, whereas Title VII follows a three-step
burden shifting framework. 58 Under Title VII, individuals proving
discrimination can proceed either through a theory of disparate
treatment or disparate impact. 59 The burden framework for both
theories is divided into three steps. This framework for a disparate
treatment case was first announced in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v.
Green. 60
53

Stopka v. Alliance of Am. Insurers, 141 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 1998).
Fallon v. State of Ill., 882 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Corning
Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 195).
55
Id.
56
Ryduchowski v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 203 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir.
2000); Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1213.
57
Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1213.
58
Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2000).
59
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
60
411 U.S. 792 (1973). Alternatively, in 1971, the Court announced the
disparate impact theory of liability for cases brought under Title VII in Griggs v.
54

137
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006

9

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 9

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 1, Issue 1

Spring 2006

Under a McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff proving a
sex-based wage discrimination claim must first establish that a
member of the opposite sex in a similar job position as plaintiff
receives a higher level of pay. 61 The burden then shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
wage discrepancy. 62 Once this minimal burden of articulation is met,
the plaintiff then has the burden of proof to establish that the proffered
reason was a pretext for discrimination. 63 Under Title VII, the burden
of proof remains with the plaintiff at all times. 64 Once a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the
defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its action. 65 If
this occurs, the plaintiff must then prove that the proffered reason is
merely a pretext for discrimination. 66 Therefore, under a Title VII
claim, the plaintiff always bears the risk of nonpersuasion. 67
D. The Legislative History and Purpose of the Equal Pay Act.
The statement of purpose of the EPA declares Congress’
findings that wage differentials based on sex “depress[] wages and
living standards for employees necessary for their health and

Duke Power Co. Unlike disparate treatment, the employer’s discriminatory intent in
irrelevant under a disparate impact theory. A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
of discrimination under a disparate impact theory by establishing that a neutral
employment policy or practice had a significant discriminatory impact on a protected
group. Once this is established, the burden then shifts to the employer to show that
the policy or practice was job-related or consistent with business necessity. The
plaintiff may still prevail at this point by showing that an alternative practice existed.
401 U.S. 424 (1971). Congress officially codified the disparate impact theory in its
amendments to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
61
Texas Dep’t. of Cmty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
62
Id.
63
Id. at 253; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
64
Fallon v. State of Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1989).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
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efficiency.” 68 Congress furthered declared that the policy of the EPA
was to correct these conditions. 69
Congress enacted the EPA in 1963 in order to “remedy what
was perceived to be a serious and endemic problem” in private
employment industries – that many wages were scaled on “an ancient
but outmoded belief that a man, because of his role in society, should
be paid more than a woman even though his duties are the same.” 70 In
addition, the Supreme Court has noted that the EPA itself is “broadly
remedial” and should be interpreted and applied in order to achieve its
underlying purposes. 71
The Supreme Court examined the legislative history behind the
EPA in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan. 72 The original version of
the Equal Pay bill only allowed for two exceptions for wage
differentials, those based on a seniority or merit increase system that
did not discriminate on the basis of sex. 73 Due to a concern that this
version of the bill did not fully encompass job evaluation systems that
established equitable wages in the industry, the amended version of
the Act defined equal work in terms of “skill, effort, responsibility,
and working conditions.” 74 The Court found that Congress’ clear
intent in incorporating this language was to “ensure that wage
differentials based upon bona fide job evaluation plans would be
outside the purview of the Act.” 75 To support this intent, the Court
quoted the House Report:
This language [skill, effort, responsibility, and working
conditions] recognizes that there are many factors which may
be used to measure the relationships between jobs and which
68

Pub. L. No. 88-38, §2(a), 77 Stat. 56 (1963).
Pub. L. No. 88-38, §2(b), 77 Stat. 56 (1963).
70
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
71
Id. at 208.
72
417 U.S. at 188.
73
Id. at 198.
74
Id. at 201.
75
Id. at 201 (emphasis added).
69

139
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006

11

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 9

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 1, Issue 1

Spring 2006

establish a valid basis for a difference in pay. These factors
will be found in a majority of the job classification systems.
Thus, it is anticipated that a bona fide job classification
program that does not discriminate on the basis of sex will
serve as a valid defense to a charge of discrimination. 76
Although the Court in Corning used the legislative history to interpret
the phrase “working conditions” as used in the EPA, 77 Congress’s
characterizations of job evaluation plans and classification systems as
bona fide demonstrate its intent to only allow factors tied to legitimate
business reasons to defend against charges of discrimination.
Of the four affirmative defenses, Congress intended the fourth
one, “factor other than sex,” to be a “broad general exception.” 78 It
was designed in order to narrow the scope of the EPA to wage
differentials based on sex discrimination. 79 Therefore, employers may
defend against discrimination litigation brought under the EPA where
differentials in pay are based “on a bona fide use of ‘other factors
other than sex.’” 80
III.

VARYING INTERPRETATIONS BETWEEN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
REGARDING PRIOR SALARY AS A FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX

A. Other Circuit Interpretations Regarding the Equal Pay Act’s Factor
Other than Sex Defense.
In County of Washington v. Gunther, the Court stated in dicta
that the fourth affirmative defense of the EPA differs from Title VII
litigation. Title VII was intended to encompass both intentional
discrimination as well as “practices that are fair in form, but

76

417 U.S. at 201 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 88-309 at 8 (1963)).
Id.
78
Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, 769 F.2d 1251, 1261 (7th Cir. 1985).
79
County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981).
80
Id.
77
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discriminatory in operation,” 81 whereas the EPA’s “factor other than
sex” defense was designed in order to narrow the scope of the EPA to
wage differentials based on sex discrimination. 82 However, the Court
noted that it was not deciding how discrimination litigation under Title
VII should be structured to incorporate the EPA’s affirmative defense
of “factor other than sex” which requires an employer to show that a
wage differential is not based on sex, different from Title VII’s burden
of proof shifting.
The Seventh Circuit inferred that this passage stated that the
EPA was limited to disparate treatment claims, and did not have a
disparate impact component. 83 However, because the Supreme Court
also noted in the same passage that EPA litigation is structured in
order to permit employers to defend charges of discrimination by
showing that a wage differential is based on bona fide uses of “other
factors other than sex,” 84 other circuits have interpreted this passage
differently than the Seventh, requiring an “acceptable business
reason” 85 in conjunction with a “factor other than sex” defense.
Circuits requiring an acceptable business to justify the EPA’s
factor other than sex defense correctly analyze EPA claims. As noted
above, EPA and Title VII litigation functions differently, with
different burdens of proof. Disparate treatment and disparate impact
analysis reflects Title VII analysis. Requiring an acceptable business
reason to justify a factor other than sex defense under an EPA claim
properly requires an employer to prove an affirmative defense.
In Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co., 86 a Title VII case dealing
with the EPA’s “factor other than sex” defense incorporated into Title
VII by the Bennett Amendment, the Ninth Circuit examined whether
Allstate’s policy of setting wages based on an employee’s former
salary constituted a “factor other than sex.” The Ninth Circuit held
81

Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170.
83
Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 469 (7th Cir. 2005).
84
Gunther, 452 U.S. at 169.
85
Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982).
86
691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
82
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that the EPA does not prohibit the use of prior salary as a “factor other
than sex,” but any such use should be justified by an acceptable
business reason. 87 The court reasoned that because the EPA is
concerned with business practices, any “factor other than sex” defense
must still be tied to an acceptable business reason. 88 Allowing wage
differentials where an employer asserts a “factor other than sex” that is
unrelated to business practices is thus “nonsensical” under the EPA. 89
The Second Circuit also requires the legitimate business reason
test when examining a factor other than sex and has correctly
distinguished EPA from Title VII litigation. In Aldrich v. Randolph
Central School District, 90 the school district defended a claim of sexbased wage discrimination under both the EPA and Title VII, claiming
that its job classification system was a “factor other than sex” under
the EPA. The school district employed both “cleaners” and
“custodians,” with custodians receiving higher pay. 91 Under local
civil service rules, custodian applicants were required to take a civil
service exam. 92 Aldrich, employed as a cleaner, claimed that she
performed the same work as male custodians but was classified and
paid as a cleaner in violation of the EPA.
The court held that a gender neutral job classification system is
a “factor other than sex” where the employer can also establish a
business related justification for the use of the system. 93 Looking to
the statutory history of the EPA, the court found an employer could
not assert a job classification system as a “factor other than sex”

87

Id. at 878.
Id. at 876.
89
Id. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit held in Irby v. Bittick that prior salary
alone is not a legitimate factor other than sex, but reliance on prior salary and
experience in setting wages for a new employee is a successful affirmative defense
as a “factor other than sex” because other business reasons then explain the use of
prior salary. 44 F.3d 949, 955-56 (11th Cir. 1995).
90
963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992).
91
Id. at 522.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 526.
88
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without more. 94 Requiring an employer to prove that a legitimate
business reason for the classification system carries out Congress’s
goal to eradicate wage discrimination. Without a business reason,
employers will be able to use a classification system as a pretext for
discrimination, thus thwarting the purpose and intent behind the
EPA. 95
The requirement for an acceptable business reason is consistent
with the legislative history of the EPA relied on by the Court in
Corning, the purpose and policy of the EPA, and the Supreme Court
decisions in Corning and Gunther. The “factor other than sex”
defense was intended to be a catch-all exception to cover bona fide
business factors other than sex. However, requiring an employer to
justify its use of a factor other than sex with a legitimate business
reason test satisfies the two-step burden shifting required by the EPA.
Requiring this test ensures that a defendant employer prove that its
wage discrepancy is not based on sex. Without the business reason
test, employers would be able to merely articulate any factor other
than sex, which does not satisfy the burden placed on defendants under
EPA litigation, and also “provides a gaping loophole in the [EPA]
statute through which many pretexts for discrimination would be
sanctioned.” 96

94

Id. at 525.
Id.
96
Id. The court stated:
Based on [the Act’s] statutory history, we conclude that employers
cannot meet their burden of proving that a factor-other-than-sex is
responsible for a wage differential by asserting use of a genderneutral classification system without more. Rather, Congress
intended for a job classification system to serve as a factor-otherthan-sex defense to sex-based wage discrimination claims only
when the employer proves that the job classification system
resulting in differential pay is rooted in legitimate business-related
differences in work responsibilities and qualifications for the
particular positions at issue.”
Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525.
95
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B. The Seventh Circuit’s Previous Interpretations regarding the Equal
Pay Act’s Factor Other than Sex Defense.
The Seventh Circuit’s recent holding in Wernsing v.
Department of Human Services stems from its prior cases under the
EPA dealing the Act’s factor other than sex defense. The Seventh
Circuit has never held that the defense requires justification by a
business-related reason. However, an examination of the circuit’s
previous decisions shows a relaxation over the years of the defendant’s
burden under the EPA, that culminates with a failure to force
defendants to actually prove their defense.
In Covington v. Southern Illinois University, 97 the plaintiff
alleged that the University discriminated against her by paying her less
than a male professor under the EPA and Title VII. 98 The district
court had found that the wage disparity was based on a “factor other
than sex”: the male professor had a higher education and experience,
and the university also employed a sex-neutral policy of maintaining
an employee’s salary when transferred from one assignment to another
within the university. 99 The university argued that this policy was
adopted to promote employee morale. 100 The plaintiff argued that the
factor other than sex defense under the EPA and Title VII where the
university maintained an employee’s salary who changed assignments
required a business-related reason or needed to relate to the
requirements of the position. 101
The court held that the university’s salary retention policy
qualified as a factor other than sex. 102 While rejecting requiring a
justification of the factor other than sex defense where prior salary is
at issue, the court distinguished this case from the decision of the
Ninth Circuit in Kouba, because a salary retention plan relies on the
97

816 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 321.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 322 n.7.
101
Id. at 321.
102
Id. at 322.
98
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prior salary from the same employer, and not a previous employer. 103
The Seventh Circuit stated that the Kouba court held that because
wages based on prior salary from a previous employer might be due to
prior discrimination, prior salary qualifies as a factor other than sex
only if its use is business-related. If SIU had considered Covington’s
prior salary in setting her starting salary, “the same concerns that
underlie Kouba would still be relevant.” 104
However, the Court continued to note that the male professor’s
salary was influenced by his seven years experience with the
university that the plaintiff did not possess. 105 In this regard, the Court
supports its holding that a salary retention plan qualifies as a factor
other than sex defense where it is justified by a business related reason
– previous experience.
In addition, the salary retention policy itself had another
business related component relied on by the Court: “We do not believe
that the EPA precludes an employer from implementing a policy
aimed at improving employee morale when there is no evidence that
that policy is either discriminatorily applied or has a discriminatory
effect.” 106 The Court further stated that although a plaintiff does not
need to establish discriminatory intent under the EPA, 107 an employer
is not barred from implementing a policy that has not been shown to
undermine the EPA, even where the policy is not related to the
requirements of the job. 108
After Covington, the Seventh Circuit examined a case
involving prior salary again in Dey v. Colt Construction &
Development. 109 The plaintiff, Dey, brought a claim alleging that Colt
violated the EPA where she was paid substantially less than her male

103

Id. at 322-23.
Id. at 323 n.8.
105
Id. at 324.
106
Id. at 322.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
28 F.3d 1446 (7th Cir. 1994).
104
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successor. 110 Finding that the male successor negotiated a salary
closer to his previous rate after an initial offer by Colt, combined with
an educational background superior to Dey’s, the Court held that the
male successor’s higher salary was based on factors other than sex and
not therefore in violation of the EPA. 111 In its analysis, the Court
noted that the “factor other than sex” defense did not need to relate to
the job position or even be business related. 112 Interesting to note, the
Court stated that in considering a factor other than sex, “we ask only
whether the factor is bona fide, whether it has been discriminatorily
applied, and in some circumstances, whether it may have a
discriminatory effect.” 113
Dey’s successor negotiated his salary to an amount closer to
his prior salary after an initial offer and the court noted that this type
of evidence “should be considered with some caution…as undue
reliance on salary history to explain an existing wage disparity may
serve to perpetuate differentials that ultimately may be linked to
sex.” 114 Although the court made a specific point of noting that the
“factor other than sex” defense need not be justified by a business
reason, it in fact was. Colt did not rely solely on prior salary to
determine the successor’s initial salary, and the successor instigated
negotiations over his salary. Further, at this point the court still
cautions that in considering a factor other than sex, the factor should
be bona fide and the court should question whether it may have a
discriminatory effect. 115
Thus, although the Seventh Circuit has never articulated a
requirement of a legitimate business reason to justify a factor other
than sex under the EPA, this requirement is nonetheless evidenced by
these two cases involving the use of prior salary to set wages.

110

Id. at 1461.
Id. at 1461-62.
112
Id. at 1462.
113
Id. (citing Fallon v. State of Ill., 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989.)
114
Id.
115
Id.
111
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IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S RECENT DECISION INTERPRETING PRIOR
SALARY AS A FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX IN AN EQUAL PAY ACT CLAIM

Wernsing v. Department of Human Services was the first case
before the Seventh Circuit where an employee’s salary was set solely
on the basis of her prior salary from a previous employer. The court
not only incorrectly analyzed the EPA claim in Wernsing, but also
ignored its own warning in Covington that where an employer sets
starting salary based on prior salary from a previous employer “the
same concerns that underlie Kouba would … be relevant.” 116
A. Wernsing v. Department of Human Services.
In this case, the plaintiff, Wernsing, brought a claim against
her employer, the Department of Human Services of Illinois, under the
EPA, alleging that she performed the same tasks as a male coworker,
under the same working conditions, but was paid substantially less. 117
Wernsing was hired as an Internal Security Investigator II, a position
that had a monthly pay scale between $2,478 to $4,466 based on prior
experience and years of service. 118 Wernsing had been earning $1,925
a month at her previous employment, and began with the Department
at $2,478 a month, almost 30% more than her previous salary. 119
Bingaman, a male coworker hired at the same time as Wernsing for
the same position, had a starting monthly salary with the Department
of $3,739, 10% higher than his prior salary. 120 Bingaman, therefore,
was earning substantially more than Wernsing for the same work
because the Department based its initial starting salaries on the
previous salary of lateral entrants, plus a raise if possible under the pay
scale for the position. 121 Further, annual 10% raises would preserve
116

Covington v. S. Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317, 323 n.8 (7th Cir. 1987).
Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 467 (7th Cir. 2005).
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
117
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the gap until employees reached the maximum amount under the pay
scale. 122
The district court held that prior salary is a “factor other than
sex,” and that the Department was not therefore in violation of the
EPA. The district court granted summary judgment for Department
and Wernsing appealed. On appeal, Wernsing argued that the
Department lacked an “acceptable business reason” for using prior
salaries to set current ones. 123 Recognizing that other circuits require
an acceptable business reason for this approach, the Seventh Circuit
stated that the EPA only requires that an employer have a reason other
than sex for its business practices, and does not require that the reason
be “acceptable.” 124
The court analogized the EPA to Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes, stating
once the plaintiff makes a prima facie case of discrimination,
all the employer need do is articulate a ground of decision that
avoids reliance on the forbidden grounds. The plaintiff then
bears the burden to show that the stated reason is a pretext for a
decision really made on prohibited criteria. 125
The court then criticized the circuits that hold prior salary
qualifies as a factor other than sex when it is justified by an acceptable
business reason. 126 The Seventh Circuit found that the Ninth Circuit
in Kouba treated an EPA claim to a disparate impact theory under
Title VII: where a plaintiff establishes that an employment practice has
122

Id.
Id. at 468. Wernsing also advanced a second argument: “that because all
pay systems discriminate on account of sex, any use of prior pay to set salary must
be discriminatory.” Id. This article focuses on Wernsing’s first argument, that
wages are a factor other than sex only when justified by an “acceptable business
reason.”
124
Id.
125
Id. at 469 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993))
(emphasis in original).
126
Id.
123
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a discriminatory effect on a protected group, the employer must then
show a business necessity for the use of that practice. 127 Because the
EPA deals only with disparate treatment, 128 the Seventh Circuit found
no justification for a business reason under its interpretation of the
Kouba court’s analysis. 129 The applicable rule, the Seventh Circuit
stated, is the one found in disparate treatment litigation and other
employment discrimination statutes: “the employer may act for any
reason, good or bad, that is not one of the prohibited criteria such as
race, sex, age, or religion.” 130
B. A Critique of the Seventh Circuit’s Decision in Wernsing v. Dep’t of
Human Services.
The problem with the analysis of the Equal Pay Act claim by
the Seventh Circuit in Wernsing is that the court analogized the EPA
to Title VII and other discrimination statutes. 131 Because the EPA has
a different burden of proof than other discrimination statutes – a twostep burden as opposed to the three step burden of proof under Title
VII – an employer must prove an affirmative defense under the EPA
and not merely articulate one. 132
The court stated that the EPA statute “asks whether the
employer has a reason other than sex – not whether it has a “good”
reason.” 133 This statement is not entirely correct because the statute
requires an employer to prove its affirmative defense, or “reason other
than sex,” and not merely to articulate one. 134
In addition, the Seventh Circuit also incorrectly rejected the
legitimate business reason test articulated by the Ninth Circuit in
127

Id.
Id. (citing County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (1981)).
129
Id.
130
Id..
131
Id.
132
Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2000).
133
Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2005).
134
Stanziale, 200 F.3d at 107.
128
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Kouba. The court found that the Ninth Circuit analogized the EPA to
a disparate impact theory and rejected this test because the EPA only
deals with disparate treatment and not disparate impact. The problem
here is that while Title VII deals with disparate treatment and disparate
impact, theories applying the three-step burden shifting process, the
EPA has its own two-step burden shifting framework. The Seventh
Circuit incorrectly identified the Ninth Circuit as using a disparate
impact theory because the language “legitimate business reason” is
also used in the three-step burden shifting framework of disparate
impact analysis. However, the Ninth Circuit in Kouba v. Allstate Ins.
applied the correct two-step EPA burden shift. Its use of requiring an
employer to justify the use of prior salary as a factor other than sex
with a legitimate business reason correctly requires an employer to
prove its affirmative defense, consistent with the framework of an
EPA analysis. Further, as the Second Circuit noted in Aldrick v.
Randolph Central School District, failing to require the use of a
legitimate business reason “would provide a gaping loophole in the
statute through which many pretexts for discrimination would be
sanctioned.” 135
The Seventh Circuit’s holding creates a situation where EPA
plaintiffs can win only where they can show that an employer’s
assertion of prior salary as a reason for a wage discrepancy is really a
pretext for discriminatory intent. 136
V. CONCLUSION
The EPA can still be an effective tool in ending wage disparities
between the sexes, but only if it is utilized correctly. By using the
three-step burden shifting framework of Title VII to analyze EPA
claims, the court is effectively eroding the EPA. EPA claims should be
treated the way Congress intended – under the two-step burden
shifting framework provided by the statute. Under this framework,
employers must offer concrete proof that the salaries of their
135
136

963 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1992).
MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET. AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 373 (3d ed. 2004).
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employees are not based on sex. Analogizing EPA litigation to that of
Title VII permits courts to too easily accept a mere articulation of a
reason other than sex, rather than requiring employers to carry their
burden of proof.
One method to ensure employers do carry their burden of proof is
to use the legitimate business test to justify a factor other than sex,
particularly where the use of prior salary from a previous employer is
at issue. Not only does this test ensure that employers will actually
have to prove that wages are not sex-related, but it is also consistent
with the purpose and legislative intent behind the statute.
Congress passed the EPA in order to remedy the broad wage
disparity between men and women. 137 Because the EPA does not
require proof of discriminatory intent on behalf of employers, it can be
even more useful than Title VII in ending the wage disparity, but only
if it is correctly implemented by the courts. Treating EPA claims in
the same manner as Title VII claims erodes the EPA, creates
defendant-friendly litigation, and undermines the purpose of the EPA –
the requirement of equal pay for equal work.

137

Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
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